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TORTS- DEFAMATION- COMMENTS MADE WHILE PETI-
TIONING A LEGISLATIVE BODY FOR A REDRESS OF GRIEV-
ANCES ARE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED. Sherrard v. Hull, 53 
Md. App. 553, 456 A.2d 59, affd per curiam, 296 Md. 189, 460 A.2d 601 
(1983). 
While speaking before the Cecil County Board of Commissioners, 
a county resident made allegedly defamatory remarks about a local 
businessman. 1 In the subsequent suit for slander brought by the busi-
nessman, the court instructed the jury that if it found that the resident 
was petitioning a legislative body for a redress of grievances, 2 then her 
comments before the Board were absolutely privileged.3 Upon the bus-
inessman's appeal from an adverse jury verdict, the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court's instruction, holding that 
statements made while petitioning a legislative body for a redress of 
grievances are absolutely privileged.4 The court of appeals affirmed 
this holding in a per curiam opinion. 5 
Courts generally recognize three types of absolute privileges appli-
cable to comments made during governmental activities:6 judicial priv-
ilege,7 legislative privilege,8 and executive privilege.9 Many jurisdic-
I. Sherrard v. Hull, 53 Md. App. 553, 555, 456 A.2d 59, 61, aff'd per curiam, 296 Md. 
189, 460 A.2d 601 (1983). The resident implied that the businessman had bribed 
one of the commissioners to obtain a change in the zoning designation of his 
property. 
2. This right is protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution, 
which provides in pertinent part that: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
. . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. 
3. Sherrard v. Hull, 53 Md. App. 553, 560, 456 A.2d 59, 63, affd per curiam, 296 Md. 
189, 460 A.2d 601 (1983). 
4. Id at 555, 456 A.2d at 61. An absolute privilege "protects the speaker or pub-
lisher without reference to his motives or the truth or falsity of the statement." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1077 (5th ed. 1979); if. "qualified privilege," infra note 
15. 
5. Sherrard v. Hull, 296 Md. 189, 460 A.2d 601 (1983) (per curiam). 
6. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS§ 114 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited 
as PROSSER]. 
7. E.g., Beeck v. Kapalis, 302 N.W.2d 90 (Iowa 1981); Sampson v. Rumsey, I Kan. 
App. 2d 191, 563 P.2d 506 (1977); Abom v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 256 N.E.2d 442 
(1970); Feldman v. Bernham, 6 A.D.2d 498, 179 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1958); Bailey v. 
McGill, 247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957). Defamatory comments made by 
judges, attorneys, parties, witnesses or jurors are absolutely privileged if the com-
ments made are related to the matter before the court. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS §§ 585-89 (1977) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. English courts 
afford an absolute privilege to these comments, whether or not related to the mat-
ter before the court. PRossER, supra note 6, at 778. 
8. E.g., McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1966); Kohn v. Davis, 390 So. 
2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Abercrombie v. McClung, 55 Hawaii 595, 525 
P.2d 594 (1974); Tocco v. Piersante, 69 Mich. App. 616, 245 N.W.2d 356 (1976). 
Defamatory comments made by a legislator during the performance of his legisla-
tive functions are absolutely privileged. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 590. The 
absolute privilege also extends to statements by witnesses testif;ring at a legislative 
proceeding, provided the statement is relevant to the proceedmg. Id § 590A. 
9. E.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Saroyan v. Burkett, 57 Cal. 2d 706, 371 
194 Baltimore Law Review (Vol. 14 
tions also recognize a privilege based on a citizen's right to petition the 
government. 10 
The right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, 
preserved by the first amendment 11 and made applicable to the states 
by the fourteenth, 12 derives from the Magna CartaY In the 1845 case 
of White v. Nicholls, 14 the Supreme Court recognized a qualified privi-
lege for statements made while petitioning the government. 15 In White, 
a group of citizens sent letters to the President and the Secretary of the 
Treasury impugning the character of a local customs official and re-
questing his removal from office. 16 The official sued the citizens for 
libel, but the Supreme Court held that publications made while peti-
tioning the government for a redress of grievances are qualifiedly 
privileged. 17 
Subsequent cases have also recognized an absolute 18 or qualified 19 
privilege for comments made while petitioning.20 Despite this case law 
development, however, the petitioning privilege does not seem to have 
gained the general acceptance that the judicial, legislative, and execu-
P.2d 293, 21 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1962); Lucy v. Muchnok, 36 Pa. Commw. 272, 387 
A.2d 945 (1978); Hackworth v. Larson, 83 S.D. 674, 165 N.W.2d 705 (1969); Gold 
Seal Chinchillas, Inc. v. State, 69 Wash. 2d 828, 420 P.2d 698 (1966). Defamatory 
comments by an executive or administrative officer, whether at the federal or state 
level, are absolutely privileged, provided they are made while performing his offi-
cial duties. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 591. 
10. See infra notes 18-19. 
11. See supra note 2. 
12. Hague v. Committee for Ind. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
13. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1004 (2d ed. 1983); 
see also 1 C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY 125 (2d ed. 1972); B. LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL 
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 321 (2d ed. 1980). 
14. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845). 
15. ld at 287, 291. A "'qualified privilege' protects defendant from liability only if 
he uttered defamatory statements without actual malice." BLACK's LAW DICTION-
ARY lll7 (5th ed. 1979). 
16. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266, 267-74 (1845). 
17. ld at 287, 291. The precedential value of White's holding that the privilege is 
only qualified is diminished by the fact that when the case was decided, the judi-
cial, legislative, and executive privileges were also only qualified. ld at 287-89. 
The latter three privileges are now held to be absolute. See supra notes 7-9. 
18. E.g., Lininger v. Knight, 123 Colo. 213, 226 P.2d 809 (1951); Yancey v. Common-
wealth, 135 Ky. 207, 122 S.W. 123 (1909); Weiman v. Mabie, 45 Mich. 484, 8 
N.W. 71 (1881); Rainer's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 
889 (1955); Campo v. Rega, 79 A.D.2d 626, 433 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1980); Bloom v. 
A.H. Robbins Co., 479 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 983 
(1972). 
19. E.g., Pinn v. Lawson, 72 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Ex parte Cypress, 275 Ala. 
563, 156 So. 2d 916 (1963); Manley v. Harer, 82 Mont. 30, 264 P. 937 (1928); 
Meyer v. Parr, 69 Ohio App. 344, 37 N.E.2d 637 (1941); State v. Kerekes, 225 Or. 
352, 357 P.2d 413 (1960); Kent v. Bongartz, 15 R.I. 72, 22 A. 1023 (1885); McKee 
v. Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455, 181 S.W. 930 (1916). 
20. There is no clear majority or minority rule as to whether the petitioning privilege 
is absolute or qualified. See 50 AM. JuR. 2D Libel and Slander§ 217 (1970); 53 
C.J.S. Libel and Slander§ 116 (1948). 
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tive privileges enjoy.21 
During the 1960's and early 1970's the Supreme Court bolstered 
the right to petition in a trilogy of cases.22 The Court found an abso-
lute petitioning privilege that insulates certain conduct from the opera-
tion of antitrust laws. This principle, known as the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine, permits companies to associate for the purposes of influencing 
the government or obtaining governmental action, when such an asso-
ciation for other purposes would violate the antitrust laws.23 Even if 
the companies' intent in petitioning the government is to eliminate 
competition, their activities are still protected from prosecution under 
antitrust laws.24 The rationale for this doctrine has two components. 
First, the government, in order to act on behalf of the people, must 
have free access to information, since "the whole concept of representa-
tion depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known 
to their representatives."25 Second, a construction of the antitrust laws 
that would punish petitioning the government would violate the first 
amendment right to petition.26 
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine will not, however, protect conduct 
found to be a "sham."27 Thus, under the "sham exception," conduct 
that is merely an effort to prevent competitors from gaining similar ac-
cess to the government,28 or that subverts the integrity of the govern-
mental process through corrupt means or misrepresentations,29 is not 
privileged. 
Over the last decade a number of courts have applied the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine to other areas of law, extending an absolute privi-
lege to petitioning activity that would otherwise be actionable.30 As in 
21. For example, a discussion of the petitioning privilege is conspicuously absent 
from the Second Restatement of Torts. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 583-612. 
22. These cases applied the privilege to the petitioning of all three branches of gov-
ernment. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 
510-ll (1972) (judicial); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 
(1965) (executive); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1961) (legislative). 
23. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 510-ll; Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670; Noerr, 365 
U.S. at 139-40. 
24. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670. 
25. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137. 
26. Id at 137-38. 
27. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 511; Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. 
28. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 512; Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 
272, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
29. Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253, 
266 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); United States v. American 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1362 (D.D.C. 1981). 
30. E.g., Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) (claim 
under the federal Civil Rights Act that defendants obtained a zoning change to 
prevent plaintiffs from building on the property); Missouri v. National Org. for 
Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.) (tortious infliction of economic harm with-
out legal excuse), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); Feminist Women's Health 
Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978) (tortious interference 
196 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
the Noerr-Pennington antitrust cases, many of these courts determined 
that the importance of protecting the right to petition outweighs any 
possible harm to the plaintiffs. 31 
In the 1981 case of Webb v. Fury,32 the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals extended Noerr-Pennington to the defamation area. 
In Webb, a coal company sued an environmental group for libel. The 
allegedly defamatory communications consisted of the environmental 
group's filing administrative complaints against the company with two 
federal agencies, and the group's publishing a newsletter accusing the 
company of polluting the environment.33 The West Virginia court held 
that since both the administrative complaints34 and the newsletter35 
were efforts to influence governmental activity, they were protected by 
an absolute petitioning privilege. Until Sherrard v. Hu//,36 Webb was 
the only case to apply the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to a defamation 
case. 
In Sherrard, the court of special appeals noted that Maryland 
courts generally follow the common law concerning defamation privi-
leges,37 recognizing the judicial,38 legislative,39 and executive40 privi-
leges.41 Until Sherrard, however, no Maryland court had addressed the 
with a business relationship), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Weiss v. Willow 
Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (conspiracy to harass and 
delay plaintiffs' application for zoning permits in violation of their civil rights); 
Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (tortious interference with 
an advantageous relationship); City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d 527,645 
P.2d 137, 183 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1982) (suit by a municipal government for malicious 
prosecution); Matossian v. Fahmie, 101 Cal. App. 3d 128, 161 Cal. Rptr. 532 
(1980) (malicious prosecution, tortious business interference, and abuse of 
process). 
31. See, e.g., Missouri v. National Org. for Women, Inc. 620 F.2d 1301, 1317 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 939 
(N.D. Cal. 1972); City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d 527, 535-36, 645 P.2d 
137, 141, 183 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90-91 (1982). 
32. 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981). 
33. /d. at 31-33. 
34. /d. at 37. 
35. /d. at 41-42. 
36. 53 Md. App. 553, 456 A.2d 59, affd per curiam, 296 Md. 1S9, 460 A.2d 601 (1983). 
37. Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 556-58, 456 A.2d at 61-63. 
38. E.g., Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 434 A.2d 547 (1981); Adams v. Peck, 288 
Md. 1, 415 A.2d 292 (1980); DiBlasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 197 A.2d 245 
(1964); Brinsfield v. Howeth, 107 Md. 278, 68 A. 566 (1908); Picone v. Talbott, 29 
Md. App. 536, 349 A.2d 615 (1975). 
39. Brush-Moore Newspapers v. Pollitt, 220 Md. 132, 151 A.2d 530 (1959) (dicta); 
Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233 (1880); Law v. Scott, 5 H. & J. 359 (1822). 
40. Walker v. D'Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 129 A.2d 148 (1957). 
41. One significant departure from the majority of American courts is Maryland's 
adoption of the "English Rule" regarding the judicial privilege afforded to wit-
nesses' comments. Under this rule, any defamatory statements are absolutely 
privileged, whether or not they are relevant to the matter before the court. E.g., 
Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 434 A.2d 547 (1981); Korb v. Kowaleviocz, 285 
Md. 699,402 A.2d 897 (1979); Schaub v. O'Ferrall, 116 Md. 131, 81 A. 789 (1911); 
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issue of whether a petitioning privilege exists in defamation cases.42 
In deciding this issue, the court first determined that the county 
resident's appearance before the Board of Commissioners did not come 
within the scope of either the judicial or legislative privileges.43 The 
judicial privilege was found inapplicable because the Board was not 
exercising judicial functions.44 The court, unsure of the "contours of 
the [legislative] privilege in a particular factual situation," also declined 
to apply that privilege to the facts before it.45 
Having held the established privileges inapplicable, the court next 
addressed the petitioning privilege. It held that a privilege does exist in 
defamation cases for comments made while petitioning a legislative 
body for redress,46 basing its holding on three grounds. The court first 
noted that the right to petition the government is one of the oldest and 
"most precious" of the liberties preserved by the Constitution.47 The 
court also reviewed the policy behind the privilege, and found that the 
promotion of free communication between the government and its citi-
zens is vital in a democratic society.48 Finally, the court recognized 
that the right to petition has been protected in the antitrust area by the 
Supreme Court through the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,49 and that this 
protection has been extended by other courts to various causes of ac-
tion, 50 including defamation. 5 1 The adoption of a petitioning privilege 
would, therefore, be in line with a trend toward expanding the scope of 
this privilege, and would recognize the important role it plays in safe-
guarding one's rights in a democratic society.52 
The court further determined that the petitioning privilege should 
be absolute, rather than qualified.53 The court noted the split of au-
thority on this issue54 and recognized that many jurisdictions have 
adopted a qualified petitioning privilege.55 The court determined, how-
ever, that the cases holding the privilege to be qualified were decided 
before the development of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, or were dis-
Hunckel v. Voneiff, 69 Md. 179, 14 A. 500 (1888). The majority of American 
courts follow the "American Rule." See PRossER, supra note 6. 
42. 52 Md. App. at 555, 456 A.2d at 61. 
43. /d. at 556-58, 456 A.2d at 62-63. 
44. /d. at 558, 456 A.2d at 62. 
45. /d., 456 A.2d at 62-63. 
46. /d. at 555, 456 A.2d at 61. 
47. /d. at 561, 456 A.2d at 64 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar 
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)). 
48. /d. at 573, 456 A.2d at 70-71. 
49. /d. at 561-63, 456 A.2d at 64-65; see supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
50. Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 563-64, 456 A.2d at 65; see supra notes 30-31 and accom-
panying text. 
51. Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 564-65, 456 A.2d at 66; see supra notes 32-35 and accom-
panying text. 
52. Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 573-74, 456 A.2d at 70-71. 
53. /d. at 567, 456 A.2d at 67. 
54. /d. at 568-70, 456 A.2d at 68-69. 
55. /d. at 569-70, 456 A.2d at 68-69; see supra note 19. 
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tinguishable in that they did not relate to the direct petitioning of a 
legislative body.56 This fact, coupled with both the "evolution" of the 
petitioning privilege under Noerr-Pennington, and the importance of 
protecting the free flow of information to the government, 57 led the 
court to hold the privilege to be absolute. 
The Sherrard court also adopted the "sham exception" 58 to the pe-
titioning privilege.59 The exception was held inapplicable, however, 
since there was no indication that the county resident "was attempting 
to interfere with the business relationships" of the plaintiff.6° Further-
more, the resident's allegedly defamatory remarks were merely inci-
dental to her appearance before the Board; she was addressing the 
Board in order to obtain governmental action and not simply to pervert 
the process in an effort to slander the plaintiff.61 
The petitioning privilege adopted by the court of special appeals in 
Sherrard v. Hull is a logical addition to the law of defamation. Since 
comments made by participants in judicial and legislative functions en-
joy an absolute privilege, the same privilege should apply to petition-
ing, which is another form of participation in governmental activities. 
Furthermore, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its subsequent expan-
sion constitute an express recognition of the importance of and the 
need to protect the right to petition. 
However, Sherrard v. Hull, as do most precedent-setting cases, 
leaves a few questions unanswered. The court provides no definition of 
what kinds of activity constitute petitioning,62 simply implying that 
whether conduct is petitioning is a question of fact for the jury.63 Thus, 
future participants in governmental activities have little guidance as to 
what conduct will be protected. 
The scope of the "sham exception" also remains undefined. The 
court found the exception inapplicable in Sherrard, but did not indicate 
whether the exception should be broadly or narrowly construed.64 The 
strong interest in protecting the right to petition indicates that the ex-
56. Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 572, 456 A.2d at 69. 
57. Id, 456 A.2d at 69-70. 
58. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
59. Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 565, 456 A.2d at 66. 
60. Id at 566, 456 A.2d at 67. 
61. Id 
62. Cases from other jurisdictions applying the petitioning privilege involve several 
different types of activity and hence offer no definitive guidelines. See supra notes 
18-19. 
63. Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 573, 456 A.2d at 70. 
64. For arguments in favor of both a broad and a narrow application of the "sham 
exception" see Note, Antitrust- Supreme Court Extends Noerr Immunity from 
Sherman Actio Allempls to Influence Adjudication, 76 DICK. L. REv. 593, 603-05 
(1972) (narrow construction); Note, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited: A New Route for Noerr-Pennington and the Sham Exception 26 Sw. 
L.J. 926, 933 (1972) (broad construction). 
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ception will be narrowly construed.65 Since, however, the petitioning 
privilege was held to be absolute the "sham exception" is the only 
means by which a defamed party can recover damages.66 Despite these 
unresolved questions, the adoption of the petitioning privilege in a 
"well-reasoned opinion"67 is a logical and needed addition to defama-
tion law. 
Michael A. Duff 
65. The court's statement that first amendment rights need "breathing space" to sur-
vive would indicate that Maryland courts will in the future construe the exception 
narrowly. Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 567, 456 A.2d at 67. 
66. See supra note 4. 
67. Sherrard v. Hull, 296 Md. 189, 189, 460 A.2d 601, 601 (1983). 
